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I. INTRODUCTION
In one of the earliest modern treatises on comparative public
law, the influential English constitutional theorist A.V. Dicey be-
gan his celebrated attack on civil law models of administrative law
by noting: "In many continental countries, and notably in France,
there exists a scheme of administrative law-known to Frenchmen
as droit administratif-which rests on ideas foreign to the funda-
mental assumptions of our English common law, and especially to
what we have termed the rule of law." 1 Much scholarship has since
been devoted to refuting Dicey's criticism and to showing that civil
law administrative systems are functionally similar to and, in the
eyes of certain scholars, even operationally superior to common law
systems in restraining unprincipled government action.
2
This Article explores whether there are any real functional'
distinctions between the U.S. and the French models of public law,
and attempts to define those differences and explain their continu-
ing relevance to prescriptive analyses for Latin American public
law reform. The use of the term "public law" is deliberate. This
Article contends that it is not possible to recognize and understand
the functional differences between the common law and civil law
models for the restraint of unprincipled government action without
expanding the inquiry beyond administrative law to include consti-
tutional law and the interrelationship between these two domains,
which together make up a single category of public law. Part I de-
velops this contention.
Part II then identifies and explains the functional differences
between what have historically been the two most important mod-
ern paradigms of public law: the French model of administrative
law and the Anglo-American model of constitutional law. The anal-
1. AN. DIcEY. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 328-29
(10th ed. 1959).
2. On the similarity between the scope of judicial review under French administrative
law and the scope of review under U.S. law, see George A. Bermann, The Scope of Judicial
Review in French Administrative Law, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 195 (1977). For a view
that the French system of administrative law is generally superior in its operation, see L.
NEVILLE BROWN & J. F. GARNER. FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 172-181 (3d ed. 1983). See
also Roger Errera, Dicey and French Administrative Law: A Missed Encounter?, 1985 PuB.
L. 695.
3. Here, the term "functional" signifies the way in which a conception of public law,
and the consequent series of practices to which it gives rise, serve to insure that government
action is principled and to protect certain fundamental rights, most notably equality before
the law and the civil liberties long recognized in the tradition of Western thought.
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ysis focuses primarily on how these two models have used the doc-
trine of separation of powers as an organizing principle.
Part III studies the historical experience of Latin America, the
most important region to draw broadly on both models. The coun-
tries of Latin America offer a particularly valuable opportunity to
study the functional differences between the two models because
their public law systems have recently traversed or continue to
traverse periods in which they prove to be largely dysfunctional in
restraining unprincipled government action.4
Part IV seeks to apply a historical understanding of the func-
tional differences between the French and U.S. models of public
law to explain why Latin America has tried to blend elements of
the two paradigms, why such attempts have been largely unsuc-
cessful, and how Latin American public law systems can be re-
formed to provide for effective control of executive action. Latin
America's long-standing and generally unsuccessful attempts to
blend the French and U.S. models are not simply a result of histor-
ical accident or biculturalism, but represent both a reaction to the
tradition of executive dominance and an ambivalence as to the
best way of controlling executive action in such a political climate.
This Article traces the failure of Latin American public law sys-
tems to the unsuitability of the ordinary courts for the role of ulti-
mate administrative watchdog which the U.S. model attributes to
them. This Article concludes by arguing that to effectively restrain
unprincipled executive action, Latin American systems ought to
abandon the U.S. model of external review by a separate branch of
government in favor of the French model of internal review by a
specialized arm of the executive itself.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CIVIL AND COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS
The common law does not draw, even at a fundamental level,
4. In his recent landmark study, The Other Path, Hernando de Soto argues with special
reference to Peru that the largely dysfunctional nature of public and private law in Latin
America constitutes one of the most important barriers to economic development and social
stability. He argues that this situation is due, in large part, to the dominance of the presi-
dent in Latin American political systems where administrators, subject to no formal disci-
pline, produce more than ninety-nine percent of all legislation. De Soto concludes that only
by making administrators accountable to the governed can Latin America hope to achieve
economic development and social stability. HERNANDO DR SOTO, THE OTHER PATH 131-187
(June Abbott trans., 1989).
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the distinction between public and private law that appears in the
first title of the first book of Justinian's Institutes.5 Indeed, it was
precisely the collapsing of this civil law distinction that was funda-
mental to the success of the common law courts as instruments of
royalist centralization. The king was viewed as having an interest
in all legal relations between his subjects, and not simply those in
which he or the state had a direct interest. In civil law nations such
as France, however, the monarchy built its disparate possessions
into a modern nation state not through the courts, but through the
creation of an administrative machinery responsible only to the
crown, and largely immune from ordinary judicial interference.6
These divergent approaches to the organization of public law
created systems of administrative law that differ significantly from
one another. Thus, while it is possible to define the subject matter
of administrative law with relative ease (the analysis of the legal
relationships between the government and the governed), and even
to outline the general principles that should control dealings be-
tween the government and citizens (fairness, equality, and the
right to be heard for example), it is extremely difficult to predict
the content of any country's administrative law system in terms of
what legal problems or relationships it will actually address. For
example, the United States protects and analyzes the right to a
hearing and other due process rights in terms of constitutional law,
while England and civil law countries such as France treat these as
5. "There are two aspects of [the study of law], public and private. Public law is that
which pertains to the Roman state, private that which concerns the well-being of the indi-
vidual." J. INST. 1.1.4, reprinted in J.A.C. THOMAS, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 3 (1975).
The distinction between public and private law is intimately related to the distinction be-
tween ius civile and ius gentium. Although this distinction is drawn in Justinian's Insti-
tutes, it is far more elegantly formulated in Gaius's own earlier Institutes:
Every people that is governed by statutes and customs observes partly its own
peculiar law and partly the common law of all mankind. That law which a peo-
ple establishes for itself is peculiar to it, and is called jus civile (civil law) as
being the special law of that civitas (State), while the law that natural reason
establishes among all mankind is followed by all peoples alike, and is called jus
gentium (law of nations, or law of the world) as being the law observed by all
mankind. Thus the Roman people observes partly its own peculiar law and
partly the common law of mankind.
G. INST. 1.1, reprinted in FRANcis DE ZuLuETA. THE INSTrITUTES OF GAJus (1946). While the
difference between these two distinctions was clear in Roman law, later writers, and particu-
larly Montesquieu, had a tendency to collapse these distinctions into a single one, associat-
ing ius gentium with public law and ius civile with private law. See infra note 25.
6. See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text for a development of this historical
contrast.
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matters of administrative law. Additionally, governmental liability
for damage caused by its actions is often analyzed not only in con-
stitutional or administrative terms but also, in common law coun-
tries at least, in terms of traditional private law tort analysis.'
Public law thus constitutes a peculiarly amorphous domain in
any given legal system. Within this domain, the line between con-
stitutional and administrative law is a point of particular flux. A
legal system's conception of public law in general, and of adminis-
trative law in particular, is therefore more likely to be shaped by
two distinct forms of external pressure: first, that exerted by the
political history of the system in question; and second, and more
importantly, that exercised by the most coherent legal categories
(or sub-categories) over the more ill-defined categories.
In the common law tradition, the development of conflicting
theories of sovereignty and the rule of law, and their use in the
seventeenth-century battle between central royal authority and the
nascent gentry-which culminated in the Civil War-propelled
constitutional law to the forefront of the public law domain in
England.' In the American context, this English heritage, together
7. On the right to a hearing under French administrative law, see BROWN & GARNER,
supra note 2, at 141-42; MARCEL WALINE, Dsorr ADMINISTRATIF 399, 405 (7th ed. 1957). The
right to a fair hearing is one of the touchstones of the English common law governing judi-
cial review of administrative action. See P.P. CRAG, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 199-231 (2d ed.
1989); S.A. DE SMIrH & J.M. EvANs, JuDIcIAL REviEw OP ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 156-247 (4th
ed. 1980); H.W.R. WADE, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW 496-579 (6th ed. 1988). The seminal case in
this area is Cooper v. Wandsworth Bd. of Works, 143 Eng. Rep. 414 (C.P. 1863) (defendant
statutory board liable for demolition of plaintiff's house pursuant to statutory authority
where it failed to grant plaintiff a hearing prior to the demolition even though no statute
explicitly required such a hearing).
8. For example, in several recent cases, English courts have used common law tort rea-
soning, particularly the question of the existence of a duty of care, to insulate administra-
tors from liability. Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong, [1988] App. Cas. 175
(P.C. 1987) (appeal taken from H.K.) (defendant not liable to depositors for negligently
exercising its powers to inspect and report on the financial condition of deposit-taking com-
panies because no duty of care existed); Rowling v. Takaro Properties Ltd., [1988] App. Cas.
473 (P.C. 1987) (appeal taken from N.Z.) (defendant minister not liable to seller for failing
to take legal advice on extent of his powers to block sale of property to foreigners because
doubtful whether such failure could ever constitute negligence and in any event no duty of
care existed); Hill v. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] 2 W.L.R. 1049 (police au-
thority not liable for negligently failing to protect members of group particularly at risk due
to activities of mass murderer because no duty of care existed).
In the United States, the government may, if negligent, be liable for discretionary ac-
tions carried out at the operational level, but not at a planning or policy level. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gaubert, 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 61 (1955); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
9. In the thirty odd years between the Stuart accession and the Civil War, both royal-
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with the discourse of the rebellion and the drive towards indepen-
dence, elevated constitutional law to the preeminent position that
it continues to occupy in the legal order of the United States."
In both countries, the importance of constitutional law tended
to delay the development of a distinct administrative domain of
public law and greatly influenced its content and shape. In Eng-
land, the power and coherence of the dual constitutional theory of
parliamentary supremacy and Crown prerogative limited control of
governmental action to those cases which could be analogized to
existing private law legal categories."' A contract with a govern-
ment body was enforceable as nothing more or less than an ordi-
nary contract, and a hearing was available prior to the seizure of
an individual's property because without the justification of such a
hearing the government body would be guilty of a trespass.12
In the United States, the same pattern of controlling adminis-
trative action through analogy to private law remedies dominated.
The difference was that, in creating rights against arbitrary admin-
istrative action, such as the right to a hearing, the U.S. courts did
not have to analogize directly to private law, but could rely on the
explicit language of the Constitution.' In France, however, the de-
ists and parliamentarians gradually came to define and distinguish their positions through
law and legalistic discourse. The importance of public law, particularly the notion of the
rule of law, as an ideological background, is evident in the nature and discourse of the Stu-
art political crises foreshadowing the war, and particularly in the impeachments of the Duke
of Buckingham and later of the Marquis of Hertford and in the famous Hampden ship-
money case. See generally CONRAD RUSSELL, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 131-211
(1990).
10. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
11. Dicey's work demonstrates the overriding importance of the constitutional doctrine
of parliamentary supremacy in the structuring of English administrative law. DicEY, supra
note 1, at 39-180; see P.P. CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 12-55 (1990).
12. Cooper v. Wandsworth Bd. of Works, 143 Eng. Rep. 414 (C.P. 1863); see WADE,
supra note 7, at 496-579 (hearings), 787-90 (contracts with public bodies).
Compare the absence of a special regime for government contracts at common law with
the creation by the French administrative courts of a complex law governing contracts be-
tween government bodies and private individuals. The seminal case in this area is the deci-
sion of the Conseil d'Etat in Compagnie General d'Eclairage de Bordeaux, 1916 D.P.III 25.
See also BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 125-131; 1 RENA CHAPuS, DRorr ADMINISTRATIF
GANRAL 736-58 (4th ed. 1988); WALINE, supra note 7, at 494-563.
13. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in relevant part:
"nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " US. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
[Vol. 24:1
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velopment of a coherent theory of administrative law, largely un-
trammeled by inapposite private law analogies, limited the need
for a distinctive body of constitutional law." French constitutional
law was an underdeveloped field, representing in practice little
more than a theoretical underpinning for administrative law, which
formed the real basis for exercising control over state action.
15 By
contrast, what is striking in the history of both English and U.S.
administrative law is how long a number of doctrines drawn by
analogy from the private law field restricted development of con-
cepts more appropriate to the specific problems raised by adminis-
trative discretion and the necessity of controlling it.",
The importance of the hegemony of constitutional law over
administrative law in the United States and England, and the op-
posite in France, can be seen in the political history of both of
these countries. Nothing is more admired in the political history of
either the United States or England than the long-term stability
and organic evolution of their respective constitutional orders. In
contrast, France has endured no less than eleven constitutions
since 1789.17 In France, the administration, not the constitution,
has provided continuity and stability. Constitutions have come and
gone, radically varying the balance of power between the legisla-
ture and executive, and even changing the very nature of the exec-
utive branch.1 8 However, the same organs governing the adminis-
trative jurisdictions have remained from constitution to
14. For a discussion of how and why French administrative law largely escaped the
influence of private law, see infra notes 29-35, 48-58 and accompanying text.
15. 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 24-45 (describing the contemporary interaction between
constitutional and administrative law and the growing importance of the former); WALINF,
supra note 7, at 6-8, 106 (describing the situation prior to the current 1958 constitution).
16. A striking example of this tendency is the persistence of the distinction between a
right and a privilege and the belief that only a right was entitled to due process protection,
drawn from the private law concept of a right capable of giving rise to a cause of action. It is
only in the last thirty years that both countries have broken with this distinction: England
probably most notably in In re H.K., [1967] 2 Q.B. 617 (1966) (immigration officer under
duty to act fairly and accord applicant opportunity to be heard, despite fact that applicant
had no right of entry); the United States even more conclusively in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (state which terminates public assistance payments to a particular recipient
violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment if it does not grant some form of
hearing); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
17. See MAURICE DUVERGER, CONSTITUTIONS ET DOCUMENTS POLITIQUES 17-260 (12th ed.
1989).
18. See id.; PIERRE AVaiL, LA VE RkPUBLIQUE: HISTOIRE POLITIQUE ET CONSTITUTION-
NELLE 29-32 (1987); JEAN GICQUEL, DRorr CONsTITUTIONNEL RT INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES 504-
559 (10th ed. 1989).
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constitution. 19 It has been in the traditionally marginal domain of
constitutional law where the greatest development has taken place
in the twentieth century, particularly in the post-war period. Not
only did the current French constitution come into being after
World War II, but the organ of constitutional review and the re-
sulting jurisprudence are as new as the constitution itself.20 In
England, however, the last twenty years have witnessed an explo-
sive growth in administrative law.21
The tendency in mature legal systems for constitutional and
administrative law to reach some kind of equilibrium, and the fact
that a given legal question can generally be analyzed from both a
constitutional and administrative law perspective, suggest that the
two domains are .not only complementary, but also indivisible. The
issue is really one of emphasis. The question is thus to understand
why the Anglo-American model of public law traditionally stressed
constitutional law and why, in contrast, the French model empha-
sized administrative law. In examining this question, it is useful to
begin with the truism that at the heart of the differences between
the common law and civil law paradigms of public law lie different
conceptions of the doctrine of separation of powers.2 2
19. In France, the jurisdiction and functions of the Conseil d'Etat have remained con-
stant despite the frequent changes in constitutional structure. For an account of the histori-
cal role and jurisdiction of the Conseil, see infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text. See
also BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 38-39; 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 477-87; WALINE,
supra note 7, at 28-31.
20. Articles 56 to 63 of the French Constitution of 1958 establish the Constitutional
Council which reviews legislation prior to its promulgation upon a request of the president,
prime minister, the president of either house of the Parliament, or (since 1975) sixty depu-
ties or sixty senators. The Council's decisions are final and binding upon all state bodies.
Gicqum, supra note 18, at 826-37.
21. The explosion in terms of practice can be seen both in the number and importance
of the cases and in the diversity of issues currently being analyzed as questions of adminis-
trative law. Since the mid-1960s, English administrative law has made a quantitative and
qualitative leap of enormous magnitude, demonstrated by decisions such as Anisminic Ltd.
v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969] 2 App. Cas. 147 (1968), which signaled a
greater openness to judicial review of administrative action. See CAIo, supra note 7 at 253-
70; DE SMITH & EVANS, supra note 7, at 3-11, 31-35; WADE, supra note 7, at 18-21. As to the
variety of questions now treated as raising issues of administrative law, one has only to take
the example of the right to a hearing. The number of issues currently analyzed under the
right to a hearing/natural justice/duty to act fairly heading in English administrative law is
simply bewildering. The area runs the gamut from questions of when and what constitutes a
hearing to highly political questions such as the relationship between central and local gov-
ernment. CRAIG, supra note 7, at 199-231; DE SMITH & EVANS, supra note 7, at 156-247;
WADE, supra note 7, at 496-579.
22. The observation is a familiar one and has been repeated by scholars of comparative
law since at least the 1950s. Nonetheless, the observation is important because it represents
the beginning of any comparative analysis of the civil and common law understandings of
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The following section will consider the origins of the doctrine
of separation of powers, as well as its impact on French adminis-
trative law and U.S. constitutional law, in order to explain the dif-
ference in emphasis between the two models and to develop a pre-
liminary understanding of the functional differences between the
two models, which can then be applied to an examination of the
Latin American experience.
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS IMPACT ON FRENCH
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The close connection between the doctrine of separation of
powers and the various paradigms of public law is far from coinci-
dental. The doctrine of separation of powers represents for politi-
cal theory the same kind of essentially flexible logical category that
"constitutional" and "administrative" law represent for the legal
world, the content of which may be endlessly varied to justify nu-
merous political arrangements. Nowhere is the potential for multi-
ple and conflicting interpretations of the concept of separation of
powers more apparent than in the work of Montesquieu.2 8 Both in
France and the United States, his name is closely identified with
the doctrine of separation of powers. As James Madison so aptly
observed in The Federalist: "If [Montesquieu] be not the author of
this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit
of at least displaying and recommending it most effectually to the
attention of mankind.1
2 4
The ambiguity of the separation of powers concept is apparent
in Montesquieu's opening formulation: "In each state, there are
three sorts of powers: the legislative power, the power to execute
things that depend on the jus gentium and the power to execute
those things that depend on the jus civilis."2 What is immediately
public law. See J. CRITELLA JONIOR, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF COMPAR9 229-34 (1973); JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, THE CiviL LAW TRADITION 87-89 (2d ed. 1985); JEAN RIVERO, COURS DE DROIT
ADMINISTRATIF COMPARA 111-16 (1955); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD 4-7 (1954).
23. CHARLES Louis SECONDAT DE LA BRIkDE DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS
(Thomas Nugent trans., 1900).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 246 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
25. "II y a dans chaque &at trois sortes de pouvoirs: la puissance legislative, la puis-
sance exkcutrice des choses qui d~pendent du drait des gens, et la puissance ex~cutrice de
celles qui dependent du droit civil." MONTSQUIEU, supra note 23, at 11:6; Richard J. Cum-
mins, The General Principles of Law, Separation of Powers and Theories of Judicial Deci-
sion in France, 35 INT'L. Comp. L.Q. 598 (1986). On the distinction between jus gentium and
19921
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striking about Montesquieu's formulation of the doctrine is just
how far it is from the U.S. principle that "the legislative, executive,
and judiciary departments ought to be separate and distinct."2
Considering judicial and administrative jurisdiction as two distinct
aspects of a single executive authority, Montesquieu employs the
traditional civil law distinction between public and private law to
distinguish between these two aspects of executive authority: "By
the first of these powers, the prince or the magistrate makes the
laws . . . . By the second, he makes peace or war, sends and re-
ceives embassies, establishes security and prevents invasions. By
the third, he punishes crimes or adjudicates disputes among pri-
vate individuals. 2 7 Unlike Madison, Montesquieu is concerned
with the separation of powers, not with the separation of organs of
government. Where the power vests is simply not relevant, pro-
vided that power is independently exercised and not used in tan-
dem with another category of powers. The U.S. conception of sepa-
ration of powers, in contrast, is about institutional separation and
competition, or in Madison's hallowed phrase, "checks and
balances.
28
The modern French conception of separation of powers, which
shaped French administrative law, was born of the Revolution.
The historian Frangois Furet, in his treatment of both the history
and historiography of the Revolution, has repeatedly emphasized
its dual nature as both a departure from the old order and the
continuation, or even the culmination, of certain dynamics within
the old order.2 This duality explains two of the most important
themes of the revolutionary struggle's impact on French public
law: first, the central theme in revolutionary politics and the strug-
gle for political control of departure from the past; second, the
rapid and ruthless completion of the process of centralization
through administrative control.3 6
Nowhere is this pattern of continuity and departure more evi-
jus civilis, see supra note 5.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 245 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
27. "Par la premiere, le prince ou le magistrat fait des lois .... Par la seconde, il fait
la paix ou la guerre, envoie ou recoit des ambassades, 6tablit la sfiret6, prkvient les inva-
sions. Par la troisime, il punit les crimes ou juge-les diffrends des particuliers." MONTES-
QUIEu, supra note 23, at 11:6.
28. For a development and explanation of this contrast, see infra notes 36-47 and ac-
companying text.
29. FRANpOIS FuRT, PENSER LA RtVOLUTION FRANIVAISE 11-130 (1978).
30. Id., at 209-56; ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, L'ANCIEN RPGIME ET LA R19VOLUTION (J.P.
Mayer ed., 1967).
[Vol. 24:1
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dent than in the French conceptions of separation of powers and of
administrative law in the early years of the Revolution. The fa-
mous Law of August 16-24, 1790, which stopped the ordinary
courts from exercising any legislative powers or jurisdiction over
the administration, is often regarded as a decisive break with the
old order.31 In explaining this limitation on the jurisdiction of the
ordinary courts, historians and lawyers have focused on the unpop-
ularity of the parlements, which used their powers to prevent royal
centralization and to block any taxation that might affect them or
their class.3 2 As important as this negative perception of the
courts, however, was the positive example of the royal administra-
tive model of government. In ancien regime France, more than an-
ywhere else in Europe, an administrative model of government
sought to centralize power in the agents of the king in direct oppo-
sition to the power of the courts. The model dominated the royal
strategy for unifying the nation and extending monarchical power.
As Tocqueville noted on the eve of the Revolution: "There was no
country in Europe where the courts depended less on the central
government than in France; but there was no country either where
exceptional [administrative] jurisdictions were more widely
employed.""
This pattern of departure and continuity lies at the heart of
the fundamental text on modern French administrative law, the
Law of August 16-24, 1790. Article 13 of the Law of August 16-24,
1790 emphasizes the departure from the old order: "Judicial func-
tions are distinct and will always remain separate from administra-
tive functions. Judges may not, upon pain of forfeiture, disturb in
any way whatsoever the operations of administrative bodies, nor
cite before them administrative officials for any reason connected
with their functions. '' 4
31. See generally WALINE, supra note 7.
32. Indeed, the final years of the ancien regime were characterized by an all-out juris-
dictional war by the parlements on royal administrative officials. 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12,
at 476-77; ALFRED SOBOUL, LA RfVOLUTION FRANQAISE 124-33 (1982); WAJINE, supra note 7, at
24-25.
33. "I1 n'y avait pas de pays en Europe oit les tribunaux ordinaires dkpendissent
moins du gouvernment qu'en France; mais il n'y en avait pas guere non plus oft les
tribunaux exceptionnels fussent plus en usage." TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 122.
34. The French version reads:
Les fonctions judiciaires sont distinctes et demeureront toujours s pares des
fonctions administratives. Les juges ne pourront, ti peine de forfaiture, troub-
ler, de quelque mani&re que ce soit, les opgrations des corps administratis, ni
citer devant eux les administrateurs pour raison de leurs fonctions.
BERNARD RUDDEN, A SOURCEBOOK OF FRENCH LAW 121 (3d ed. 1991).
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Montesquieu's exposition of the separation of powers doctrine
provided a brilliant theoretical construct for the centralization of
authority through the expansion of administrative jurisdiction. It
also meshed perfectly with the fundamental Roman and civil law
distinction between public and private law. The ordinary courts
were concerned with settling differences among private individuals
and punishing criminals, while the administration exercised those
powers conferred by public law. Tocqueville captured perfectly the
evolution from the fundamental political tendencies of the ancien
regime to a new conception of separation of powers and adminis-
trative autonomy:
It had [already] become established, not in the laws themselves,
but, as a maxim of government, in the minds of those that ap-
plied them, that all actions in which a public interest is in-
volved, or that derive from the interpretation of an administra-
tive act, are not within the jurisdiction of the ordinary judges,
whose only role is to decide among private interests. In this area,
we did no more than devise the formula; the idea itself belongs
to the ancien r~gime.35
The United States, in contrast, derived from the writings of
Montesquieu a very different notion of separation of powers. The
Colonial rebellion against the British fostered the same dynamic of
departure and continuity that was present in the French Revolu-
tion. The United States saw itself as breaking away from England,
but deliberately took much that was English with it, as numerous
state general reception statutes indicate."0 In particular, the
35. The French version reads:
I1 s'tablit, non dons leas lois, mais dans L'esprit de ceux qui leas appliquent,
comme maxime d',tat, que tous les proc~s dans lesquels un int~r~t public est
m916, ou qui naissent de l'interpr~tation d'un acte administrati, ne sont point
du ressort des juges ordinaires, dont le seul r6le est de prononcer entre des
intr&ts particuliers. En cette mati~re nous n'avons fait que trouver la formule;
& l'ancien rgime appartient l'ide.
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30, at 123.
36. For a typical example, see the Vermont General Reception Statute of 1782 which
provided:
Whereas, it is impossible, at once, to provide particular statutes adopted to
all cases wherein law may be necessary for the happy government of this people.
And whereas, the inhabitants of this State have been habituated to conform
their manners to the English laws, and hold their real estate by English tenures.
Be it enacted, &c. that so much of the common law of England, as is not
repugnant to the constitution or to any act of the legislature of this State, be,
and is hereby adopted, and shall be, and continue to be, law within this State.
And whereas, the statute law of England is so connected and interwoven
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United States took with it a legacy of courts which were largely
dependent upon royal power, and which since the late Middle
Ages, had formed a crucial link in the construction of the nascent
state.5s The partnership between the Crown and the judiciary, so
important to the building of a central English state, and so differ-
ent from the administrative state-building pattern shared by the
kingdoms of Continental Europe, left little room for the distinction
between private and public law that is so fundamental to the civil
law tradition.8
This common law legacy provided the United States with the
seeds of a new conception of separation of powers, one in which
the judiciary would be perceived not simply as a body exercising a
separate power, but rather as a separate branch of government.
While part of the basis for this new conception was already at
hand in the tradition of the royal English courts' involvement in
public law, other elements emerged out of the struggle against the
British and the consequent social and constitutional ferment to
which it gave rise. The historians Bernard Bailyn and Gordon
Wood have chronicled this rise and transformation of a distinct,
with the common law, that our jurisprudence would be incompleat (sic] without
it; therefore,
Be it further enacted, that such statute laws and parts of laws of the king-
dom of England, as were passed before the first day of October, Anno Domini
one thousand seven hundred and sixty, for the alteration and explanation of the
common law, and which are not repugnant to the constitution, or some act of
legislature, and are applicable to the circumstances of the State, are hereby
adopted and made, and shall be and continue to be, law within this State: and
all courts are to take notice thereof, and govern themselves accordingly.
Vermont General Reception Statute of 1787, reprinted in ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRIT-
ISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW, 1776-1836. at 63-64 (1974).
37. DE SMITH & EVANS, supra note 7, at 5-6, 93-94, 585; G.R. ELTON, THE TUDOR CON-
STITUTION 163-67 (2d ed. 1982); J.A. Guy, THE CARDINAL'S COURT 1-21, 132-39 (1977); SFC.
MiLSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 31-36, 124-34 (2d ed. 1981).
38. As direct emanations of royal authority, the English courts, and particularly the
courts of the Chancery and King's Bench, strived not only to settle private differences and
punish criminals to preserve the King's peace, but also to extend royal jurisdiction as far as
possible. Most importantly in political terms, the courts asserted jurisdiction against
subordinate, local administrative authorities. Hence the writ was both a royal command
issued under the King's authority and the foundation of the courts' jurisdiction. This histor-
ical background is essential to understanding the political role played by the English courts'
extensive powers of enforcement, as reflected in the inherent jurisdiction and contempt
powers. Because the English courts were direct emanations of royal authority and responsi-
ble for extending that authority's jurisdiction, they received the explicit powers of coercion
that, in Roman and civil law systems, form an exclusive element of executive power. See
JOHN C. Fox. THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 1-4 (1927); RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE
CONTEMPT POWER 1-25 (1963); CHRISTOPHER J. MILLER, CoN'TEMPT OF COURT 1-2 (2d ed.
1989).
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American conception of the doctrine of separation of powers in the
years leading up to the American Revolution, and even more im-
portantly between independence and the Constitutional
Convention. 9
In the years leading up to the rebellion and during the Revolu-
tion itself, separation of powers was primarily invoked to prevent
executive and judicial interference with the legislature, which alone
was felt to represent the colonial peoples.40 Post-independence
state constitutions thus tended to weaken both the executive and
the judiciary by requiring annual election of the executive by the
legislature, by reserving most powers of appointment to the legisla-
ture, and in some instances, by providing for the direct election of
judges."' Factional struggles and governmental paralysis, which the
legislature's dominance of the executive and judiciary was felt to
engender, led in the first years of state independence to a recasting
of the doctrine of separation of powers by members of the emerg-
ing Federalist movement. The Federalists discarded the ideas that
popular sovereignty lay solely with the legislature and that separa-
tion of powers could only be achieved by preventing the executive
and judiciary from interfering with the legislature. In its place the
Federalists articulated a new conception-sovereignty by com-
pact-in which the people conferred legitimacy on all three
branches of government as consecrated by the Preamble to the
Constitution.42  This transformation permitted the Federalists to
39. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
40. As Wood and Bailyn have both noted from different angles, the fear of executive
conspiracy against the liberties secured by the legislature was one of the principle themes of
the rebellion of the colonies. Wood noted that there was a real dimension to this fear and
that royal governors had, in most states, powers far beyond even those wielded by the exec-
utive in Great Britain. Patriots were suspicious not only of executive power, but also of the
judges whom they saw as little more than mouthpieces of the executive. WOOD, supra note
10, at 150-61. Bailyn noted that these fears of conspiratorial attack on the legislature found
fertile ground in the psyche of the colonial elite who identified strongly with the struggle of
the sixteenth-century parliamentarians against royal absolutism. BAILYN, supra note 10, at
198-229.
41. The Virginia Constitution of 1776, for example, reserved to the legislature the
power of appointing all the chief judges and the attorney general by joint ballot. The Dela-
ware Constitution of 1776 similarly gave the General Assembly and the President (the head
of the executive authority) the power to appoint the leading justices of the state; the Gen-
eral Assembly also controlled the nomination of all justices of the peace. The Georgia Con-
stitution of 1776 provided for the annual election of all judges except for justices of the
peace and registers of probate, whom the legislature appointed. All of these constitutions
provided for the election of the governor by joint ballot of the legislature, and all but Dela-
ware limited the term to one year. See generally WooD, supra note 10, at 132-50.
42. The Preamble to the U.S. Constitution provides:
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reformulate the concept of separation of powers into a theory of
government in which three independent branches check and bal-
ance one another .s
The transformation is readily apparent in Hamilton, Madison,
and Jay's writings in The Federalist. In the first essays setting out
the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton dwelt at
length on the need for a central judicial power. The passage is es-
pecially revealing because it captures the dual and distinctive
dimensions of the common law legacy inherited by the United
States in the public law domain: the legitimacy of government by
courts as an emanation of central authority, and the concomitant
power of coercion over both individuals and autonomous but infer-
ior governmental bodies. Thus, Hamilton wrote:
Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to
the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other
words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience .... This
penalty, whatever it may be, can only be inflicted in two ways;
by the agency of the courts and ministers of justice, or by mili-
tary force; by the COERCION of the magistracy, or by the CO-
ERCION of arms. The first kind can evidently apply only to
men; the last kind must of necessity be employed against bodies
politic, or communities of states .... In an association, where
the general authority is confined to the collective bodies of the
communities that compose it, every breach of the laws must in-
volve a state of war, and military execution must become the
only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of things can
certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would any
prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it."
4
The coercive public law role of the courts, which traditional En-
glish theory derived from their association with central royal au-
thority, was now justified and recast in terms of popular sover-
eignty, transforming the judiciary into an independent, third
branch of government and greatly expanding its field of action.
Arguing that the new union would require a central judicial
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
43. WooD, supra note 10, at 446-63.
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
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authority to review the constitutionality of the acts of other gov-
ernmental bodies, Hamilton emphasized that sovereignty lay with
the people, who exercised it via the constitutional compact, rather
than with the legislature, which simply represented the people. "It
is not otherwise to be supposed that the constitution could intend
to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will
to that of their constituents. '"" In this context of limited legislative
authority, review for excess of authority was a necessary corollary.
That the review was to be judicial followed from the common law's
collapsing of the distinction between public and private law. For
Hamilton, a constitution was no more than a fundamental law, hi-
erarchically superior, but not essentially different or separate from
any other body of law:
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov-
ince of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be, re-
garded by the judges as a fundamental law. It must therefore
belong to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning
of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body."
Where the two conflicted, the more fundamental must be pre-
ferred, and the conflicting legislative norm set aside. Hamilton was
careful to emphasize, however, that this conclusion did not
by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legisla-
tive power. It only supposes that the power of the people is su-
perior to both; and that where the will of the legislature de-
clared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people
declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed
... by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are
not fundamental.
4 7
Thus, judicial review, conceived as the action of a branch of gov-
ernment external to and independent of both the legislature and
the executive, emerged as the centerpiece of the new U.S. para-
digm of public law.
The French paradigm of public law developed out of a differ-
ent response to a very similar crisis. In France, as in the United
States, the problem was legislative instability. The paralysis of the
legislature under the Terror and Directory prevented effective gov-
ernment and gave Bonaparte the opportunity to organize first the
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 398-99.
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Consulate and then the Empire.48 The genius of the Consulate and
Empire was that they overtly adopted the royal administrative
model on which the early revolutionaries, for all their insistence on
legislative dominance of a republican government, had been com-
pelled to rely. 0
The Empire not only glorified the administration, but pro-
vided it with new autonomy by insulating it from the legislative
interference that had characterized all of the earlier revolutionary
regimes.50 Napoleon created and implemented a powerful and cen-
tralized administration as the State's primary tool for governance
under the influence of a number of interrelated pressures. First, he
had come to power as the principal representative of a diffuse se-
ries of interests which wished to create a strong executive author-
ity capable of putting an end to confrontation among revolutionar-
ies and counter-revolutionaries. Second, the revolutionary wars
had demonstrated that even the mere beginnings of a modern bu-
reaucracy could mobilize an entire nation for war, and the perfec-
48. Legislative instability during the Terror resulted largely from the practice of dele-
gating authority to powerful committees such as Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety.
The Directory Constitution which emerged from the Thermidorean reaction specifically for-
bade this practice. The Directory itself proved to be an unstable regime because of the
legislative paralysis to which it gave rise. By initially reserving all the positions on the Di-
rectory (which constituted the executive and named and revoked the ministers who re-
mained responsible to it alone) and the majority of the seats in the bicameral legislature to
the revolutionary members of the Convention, it created a government that was far more
republican and revolutionary than either the limited electorate enfranchised under the
French Constitution of 1795 or the populace at large. As economic difficulties grew, both
groups increasingly felt the attraction of the royalist counter-revolutionaries. In the elec-
tions of 1797, the electorate returned a majority of moderate counter-revolutionaries
favorable to the restoration of a constitutional monarchy; the entrenched majority on the
Directory remained, however, firmly republican in orientation. From the elections onwards,
conflict between the executive and the legislature spiralled out of control with the Directory
increasingly resorting to the army, and particularly to Bonaparte's troops, to maintain the
counter-revolutionary politics of the legislature in check. Ultimately, Bonaparte in 1799 en-
ded this political dynamic of paralysis and confrontation by seizing power himself. See
DUVERGER, supra note 17, at 89; GIcQUEL, supra note 18, at 507-12.
49. Most importantly, the revolutionaries had to rely on the royal, administrative ma-
chinery in organizing the Revolution's first outstanding success, the defence of the nation in
1791-1792 against invasion by Europe's monarchies. Forming and equipping the citizen-sol-
dier units that were to transform modern warfare would not have been possible without the
efficiency of the royal administrative machinery. 1 ALFRED COEBAN, A HISTORY OF MODERN
FRANCE 91, 108, 204-205, 211, 235 (3d ed. 1963).
50. During the periods when the legislature dominated revolutionary politics, such as
the years from the fall of the monarchy to the Directory, it was common for the assembly to
dispatch roving commissions made up of deputies or appointed representatives to inquire
into and often interfere with the activities of administrators. GicQUmL, supra note 18, at
507-12.
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tion of a centralized administration thus formed an important di-
mension of Napoleon's plans to dominate Europe. Third,
government through professional administrators found powerful
support in the revolutionary and Bonapartist reading of imperial
Roman history, representing only one of the many important ef-
fects that the ideology of neo-classicalism had on the institutions
of the Revolution and the Empire. This legacy of an autonomous
administration, fully independent from the control of both the or-
dinary judiciary and the legislature, though bound to execute laws
made by the latter, was probably the most lasting effect of the Em-
pire on French political history. 1
Administrative autonomy led. logically and almost immediately
to the second great strand in the French paradigm of public law:
the need for administrative internal review. In the early revolu-
tionary years, such review occurred on an ad hoc basis: claimants
would simply appeal to superior administrative authorities or local
administrative commissioners for a review of their subordinates'
acts.52 This structure of internal review was systematized, as part
of Bonaparte's 1799 constitutional reforms, by the creation of the
Conseil d'ttat53 The Council heard claims for compensation for
administrative action and for the annulment of administrative
acts, which it would then pass on to the First Consul with a recom-
mendation for resolution. Rarely did the head of state fail to follow
such recommendations.54 Thus, almost from the beginning it was
51. 2 COEBAN, supra note 49, at 19-26; F9LIX PONTEIL, NAPOLI§ON IER ET L'ORGANISATION
AUTORITAIRE DE LA FRANCE 101-09 (2d ed. 1965).
52. The directoire, the collegial, executive organ of the newly formed departments,
heard appeals from the actions of local administrators (Law of September 7-11, 1790); all
other appeals went directly before the council of ministers presided over by the King (Law
of April 27 - May 25, 1791). Following the fall of the monarchy and the adoption of the
French Constitution of 1795 which suppressed the principle of ministerial collegiality, each
minister judged appeals involving the actions of his own subordinates. 1 CHAIPus, supra note
12, at 476-77; WALiNE, supra note 7, at 26.
53. The organizing principle behind many of Napoleon's reforms was the recognition of
the importance of expertise. The Council represented the application of this principle to the
administrative domain. 2 COBBAN, supra note 49, at 19-26; PoNTEIL, supra note 51, at 101-
09.
54. Formally, the decision lay with the titular head of state. Thus during the Empire it
was with the Emperor; during the Restoration and July Monarchy with the King; and then
with the Emperor again under the Second Empire. Although it is impossible to know with
certainty the number of occasions on which the advice of the Conseil d'Etat was not fol-
lowed due to the destruction of the Council's archives during the Paris Commune of 1871, it
is believed that its recommendation was ignored only two or three times in the whole sev-
enty-odd year history of this procedure. 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 479; WALINE, supra
note 7, at 27-28.
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readily apparent that the theory that administrative adjudication
belonged to the titular head of executive authority was a myth
concealing the existence of an autonomous jurisdiction within the
executive branch.
This reality of a specialized, independent jurisdiction was rein-
forced by the creation in 1806 of a separate adjudication section of
the Council, the section du contentieux, which was fully autono-
mous from the sections that handled the drafting and advisory
functions that formed and continue to form the Council's other
primary domains of activity." The same decree that established
the section du contentieux also provided the Council with a proce-
dural code, setting out the methods of pleading and guaranteeing
the Council's impartiality." The Council received full jurisdic-
tional autonomy when the requirement of executive approval of its
recommendations was abolished (first briefly under the Second Re-
public, and then definitively under the Third Republic).57
The United States had combined the legacy of the English
common law courts as organs of enforcement of royal public law
with a reinterpretation of the concept of separation of powers, in
light of popular sovereignty theory, to produce a public constitu-
55. WALINE, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing Decree of July 22, 1806). Under the French
Constitution of 1799, the Council's primary function was to act as the government's adviser
on and drafter of legislation. The Constitution of 1799 went so far as to require that the
Council prepare drafts of all legislation; the legislature could only adopt or reject the pro-
posed text and was forbidden any right of amendment. Even today under the French Con-
stitution of 1958, the opinion of the Council is required on all drafts of parliamentary legis-
lation (projets de loi), on all ordinances passed by the government pursuant to an
exceptional delegation of law-making authority by the Parliament (Articles 38 and 39 of the
1958 Constitution) and on all governmental decrees modifying the legislative texts of the
past Republics, or being made under laws explicitly requiring the opinion of the Council on
the measures adopted to implement them. Even where the Council's opinion is not required,
ministers commonly consult with the Council before exercising decree powers. WALINE,
supra note 7, at 28-29, 152-53; 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 298-305.
56. WALINE, supra note 7, at 29 (discussing Decree of July 22, 1806). Procedure before
the section du contentieux of the Council was then, and remains today, extremely simple.
The applicant lodges a straight-forward and brief complaint with the Council, which then
delegates the task of fact-finding, known as instruction in French law, to one of its sub-
sections. Typically, a sub-section will then solicit a formal, written response from the rele-
vant administrative body and give the applicant an opportunity to respond to this response.
Various independent, expert studies may also be commissioned where questions of fact are
in doubt. The crucial reform of the 1806 code was to require the Council to act as an impar-
tial finder of fact and to guarantee the applicant a right of reply to the administrative
body's statement of the facts. See WALINE, supra note 7, at 29-31; BROWN & GARNER, supra
note 2, at 57-64.
57. WaNE, supra note 7, at 30-31 (discussing Law of March 3, 1849, repealed by De-
cree of January 25, 1852, and reinstated by Law of May 24, 1872).
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tional law, with external review by an independent judiciary as the
centerpiece. France, in contrast, turned to the royal administrative
model of its past, making use of its own conception of separation of
powers to perfect administrative autonomy and internal review
and to develop a public law which is primarily administrative,
rather than constitutional, in form.58
IV. LATIN AMERICAN SYSTEMS OF PUBLIC LAW
Most Latin American nations gained their independence in
the ten or twenty years immediately following the development of
these two paradigms of public law. The new nations of Latin
America were thus faced with a unique opportunity to choose be-
tween the recently developed French and U.S. models. Both car-
ried with them the prestige of a successful revolution. The French
system had the additional advantage of deriving from the civil law
tradition and of forming the counterpart to France's new private
law code, which appeared as a natural model for the codes that the
new nations of Latin America were already contemplating. The
U.S. model had the attraction of deriving from a similar struggle of
colonists who overthrew the representatives of the parent country.
Yet, none of the new nations chose one system or the other. In-
stead, they drew on elements from both systems, adopting on the
one hand, rigid constitutions that clearly subordinated both the
executive and the legislature to the constitution and, on the other,
elements of the French administrative law system of internal
review. 59
This fusion of the two paradigms has tended to produce a cer-
tain amount of tension and ambiguity within the Latin American
conception of public law and has contributed to the apparent lack
of connection between political and legal structure that surrounds
58. This primarily administrative model of public law proved remarkably resilient, last-
ing with only slight variation through countless regimes until the collapse of the Fourth
Republic in 1958 forced a reconsideration of the constitutional domain. The Gaullists who
drafted the constitution of the Fifth Republic insisted on the introduction of a special con-
stitutional tribunal, the Constitutional Council, to create an organ capable of adjudicating
disputes between the legislature and the government. AvaL, supra note 18, at 29-32; Comit0
National chargk de la Publication des Travaux Prparatoires des Institutions de la Ve
R~publique, in DocumENrs POUR SERvi A L'HISTOIRE DE L'LABORATION DE LA CONSTITUTION
DU 4 OCTOBRE 1958, at 77-79, 149-54 (1991) [hereinafter Comitk National]; GICQUEL, supra
note 18, at 540-59, 826-37.
59. R.S. Barker, Constitutionalirsm in the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective, 49 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 891 (1988).
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the operation of the individual national systems. As H~ctor Mairal
noted in the preface to his recent comparative study of Argentine
administrative law: "We Argentinean administrative lawyers have
managed to impose our dream on reality. We dreamt of an admin-
istrative law made in the image of French law and, gradually, as
professors, as authors and as legislators, we have converted our
dream into reality despite its incongruity with our constitutional
system." 0
The most intriguing aspects of combining these two dominant
paradigms of public law are the widespread existence of the phe-
nomenon within the Latin American region and its persistence
over practically two hundred years of that region's history. Instead
of conforming to one model, and then developing a balance be-
tween the administrative and constitutional domains, the Latin
American systems have seesawed from one paradigm to the other
and thus, have failed to develop a public law system capable of
restraining the executive and insuring principled governance."' As
will be discussed below, this inability to conform decisively to one
paradigm or the other reflects the fundamental Latin American po-
litical reality of presidential dominance and an ambivalence over
how to react to such dominance.
The next two sections take Argentina and Colombia as histori-
cal examples, demonstrating how each country has seesawed back
and forth from one paradigm to the other. This Article selects Ar-
gentina and Colombia because they both have a strong tradition of
public law thought and commentary, and both have lately trav-
ersed or continue to traverse periods in which their public law sys-
tems prove to be largely dysfunctional. The third section analyzes
these historical case studies to illustrate how presidential domi-
nance, coupled with the aforementioned ambivalence, has pre-
vented Latin American nations from conforming to any one para-
digm. The last section argues that many of the most influential
60. The French version reads:
Como el personaje mitico de Borges, los administrativistas argentinos hemos
logrado imponer nuestro sueFho en la realidad. Hemos sofado un derecho ad-
ministrativo hecho a la imagen y semejanza del franc6s y, gradualmente, como
profesores, como autores, y como legisladores, lo hemos convertido en realidad
a despecho de su incongruencia con nuestro sisterna constitucional.
1 HACTOR A. MAIRAL, CONTROL JUDICIAL DE LA ADMINISTRACIN P(OBLICA, at vii (1984).
61. On the development of a balance between the administrative and constitutional do-
mains, as observed in the mature legal systems of France and the United States, see supra
Part II.
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voices for reform err in urging closer conformity to the U.S. para-
digm of public law as a basis for stability in Latin America and
that only movement towards the French model can help the na-
tions of Latin America to reorganize their public law systems.
A. Argentina
Argentina, after an initial period of hesitation, came out
squarely in favor of judicial review in the Constitution of 1853.62
The Argentine Supreme Court later recognized that implicit in the
adoption of language similar to that in the U.S. Constitution was
acceptance of the Marbury v. Madison doctrine of judicial re-
view."3 Furthermore, in 1862, the legislature expressly conferred ju-
risdiction to hear administrative cases on all federal courts.6 4 Thus,
from the foundation of the modern Argentine Republic until the
early twentieth century, judicial review represented the dominant
theoretical framework for controlling administrative action.
Nevertheless, beginning in 1905 with Buenos Aires, the pro-
vincial governments began to adopt systems more closely modeled
on the French conception of administrative autonomy and internal
review. This movement towards the French paradigm in provincial
administrative law culminated in the adoption in 1941 of the first
"modern" provincial administrative code." The federal legislature
62. At first Argentina alternated between entrusting review of administrative actions to
the judiciary and permitting the executive to hear direct appeals along the lines of the
French model of internal review. Compare Provisional Statute for the Organization of the
Government of the State of 1815 (granting the executive the power to hear challenges
against administrative actions) with ARG. CONST_ art. 123 (1829) (granting the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to hear challenges against administrative actions).
63. The relevant articles of the Argentine Constitution of 1853 (Articles 94 to 103) are
practically a word-for-word translation of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 1 MAMAL,
supra note 60, at 94-95; Alberto F. Garay, Federalism, the Judiciary and Constitutional
Adjudication in Argentina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional Model, 22 U. MIAMI
INTER-Am. L. REv. 161 (1991). For a discussion of the Marbury view of judicial review, see
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); 1 MAIRAL, supra note 60, at 101-02.
64. 1 MAIRAL, supra note 60, at 96-97 (discussing Law 27 of 1862).
65. The first of the "modern" provincial administrative codes was that of the province
C6rdoba. The C6rdoba code was even more openly modeled on the French conception of
separation of powers than the Buenos Aires code of 1905. While leaving jurisdiction with the
ordinary courts, it introduced French forms of action, in particular drawing the distinction
fundamental to French administrative law, between the action for annulment (recours en
annulation) which may be brought by any person showing a legitimate interest, and the
action of full jurisdiction (recours de pleine jurisdiction), under which compensation for
administrative action may be sought, but which may only be brought by a person who can
demonstrate the infringement of a personal right, and even then only following an initial
request to the responsible administrative body for compensation. BROWN & GARNER, supra
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then began to propose separate administrative courts, but such
proposals foundered on executive opposition. The debate over such
a system came to a standstill in 1960, when the Supreme Court
held that administrative courts were constitutional only to the ex-
tent that judicial review of their decisions was available.66 Propo-
nents of a system more closely modeled on the French one were
successful, however, in organizing separate administrative cham-
bers within the federal appellate courts.67
This confusion of the French and U.S. systems was further ex-
acerbated by the Administrative Procedure Law of 1972, which in-
troduced a general requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and created extremely brief limitation periods. Although
these restrictions were modeled on the French system, the Act
failed to incorporate the broader rules of standing that French ad-
ministrative law has traditionally recognized as a counter-balance
to its exhaustion provisions and short limitation periods.68 For this
reason, the Administrative Procedure Law of 1972 has generally
been viewed as retrogressive (even by partisans of the French para-
digm) and has resulted in renewed calls for the transformation of
the administrative chambers into a separate jurisdiction, the pro-
cedure and substantive law of which would be more closely
modeled on the French system.69
B. Colombia
In contrast to Argentina, Colombia began with a system of ad-
note 2, at 101-02, 109-121; 1 MAMRAL, supra note 60, at 101-02.
66. Judgment of Sept. 19, 1960 (Ferndndes Arias v. Poggio), CSJN, 247 Fallos 646, 652
(1960) (Arg.).
67. Appeals from decisions of the administrative chambers of the Federal Court of Ap-
peals can be made to the Supreme Court, but only on matters involving federal law or the
federal constitution. 1 MRAL, supra note 60, at 103-04 (discussing Laws 12,967 of 1947 and
13,278 of 1948).
68. 1 MAntAL, supra note 60, at 105, 110-23 (discussing articles 23 and 27 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Law of 1972). In French administrative law, short limitation periods,
generally of sixty days or less, have traditionally been justified as the counterpart to broad
rules of standing. The theory is that for the action of annulment, the breadth of protected
interests capable of bringing an action is such that one or more affected parties ought to be
able to bring an action within sixty days from the promulgation of the challenged text. The
same period also applies to actions invoking the full compensatory jurisdiction of the court,
but in such instances, the limitation period only runs from the date that the administration
refuses to recognize that it has infringed a subjective right of the plaintiff and denies com-
pensation. BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 102-04.
69. 1 MAmAL, supra note 60, at 106-07.
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ministrative law modeled far more closely on the French system.
As early as 1817, Bolivar created the Consejo de Estado as part of
his liberation campaign.70 As in France, the early Council's role
was primarily advisory, but over time this advisory function blos-
somed into a genuine adjudicatory authority. This development
was recognized by the Constitution of 1886, which provided for a
separate section of the Council to sit as the nation's highest admin-
istrative court.7 1 The new Colombian Constitution of 1991 has
largely preserved this state of affairs. However, just as Argentina
has felt the attraction of the French administrative model, Colom-
bia has felt the pull of the U.S. constitutional model. Indeed, the
U.S. paradigm of public law has always represented a model for
Colombian constitutional law, and each of Colombia's numerous
nineteenth century constitutions relied heavily on the U.S. concep-
tion of separation of powers.
7
1
The conflict between the two paradigms gathered momentum
with the liberal 1910 constitutional reforms which explicitly recog-
nized the Supreme Court's role as "guardian of the integrity of the
Constitution," granting the Court jurisdiction to review the consti-
tutionality of laws.78 The Consejo de Estado retained jurisdiction
to hear all other challenges to administrative acts and decrees;
such challenges could be made on constitutional grounds, or any of
the grounds recognized by general principles of civil administrative
law.7 4 Colombia's new constitution leaves the jurisdiction of the
Consejo de Estado entirely untouched.75 It is the Supreme Court
that loses ground to the new Constitutional Court, which assumes
virtually the entire constitutional jurisdiction formerly exercised
by the Supreme Court.7  Indeed, despite the fact that the
70. EDUARDO Rozo ACUAA, SISTEMA CONSTITUCIONAL COLOMBIANO 178-80 (1982).
71. COLOM. CONST. art. 141(3) (1886), reprinted in WILLIAM MARION GIBSON, THE CON-
STITUTIONS OF COLOMBIA 337 (1948).
72. Rozo ACURA, supra note 70, at 49.
73. Until this year, this jurisdiction also extended to decrees passed under powers dele-
gated to the executive by congress on an extraordinary basis, or for the making of public
sector contracts or concessions, or pursuant to the recommendations of the standing com-
mittee on the national economic plan, or finally passed pursuant to the declaration of a state
of emergency by the President. CONSTITUci6N POLTICA DE COLOMBIA 103-06, 175 (Javier
Henao Hidr6n, ed., 5th ed. 1984); Rozo ACURIA, supra note 70, at 49-50, 168-71.
74. See Rozo ACURA, supra note 70, at 180; CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, supra
note 73, at 152, 177.
75. Articles 236 to 238 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution provide for a jurisdiction
identical to that formerly exercised by the Consejo de Estado under Articles 141(3) and 216
of the previous constitution.
76. Articles 239 to 245 of the 1991 Constitution provide for the establishment of an
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percieved need for an independent Constitutional Court was one of
the primary motivations for the latest round of Colombian consti-
tutional reforms, the grip of the French model on the Colombian
system of administrative law is so strong that the new Constitu-
tional Court will have no supervisory jurisdiction over decisions of
the Consejo de Estado involving issues of constitutional law.
7
7
C. The Political Dynamic of Latin America and Its Impact
on Systems of Public Law
The tendency of Latin American public law systems to draw
on two disparate paradigms of public law, based on sharply diver-
gent conceptions of the doctrine of separation of powers, reflects
the fundamental reality of Latin American political history: the
dominant position of the executive branch. Due to the authorita-
rian pattern of colonial rule, the nature of exploitative economic
development, and the tradition of caudillismo (fostered by the
struggle for independence from Spain and subsequent foreign and
civil wars), presidential dominance of politics and government has
long been, and remains today, the defining element of the Latin
American political experience.7 8 The reaction to this reality has
been both complex and ambivalent. There have been frequent
calls, and even some attempts, to rein in the powers of the execu-
tive. However, the tendency to fall back on a strong executive at
independent Constitutional Court with exclusive and final jurisdiction to hear direct actions
challenging the constitutionality of a promulgated law, see COLOM. CONST. art. 245(4), or
governmental objections to the constitutionality of proposed legislation, see id. art. 245(8).
The Constitutional Court is also required to review the constitutionality of all legislation
decreed by the executive pursuant to the President's emergency powers under Articles 212
to 215. Id. art. 245(7). All that remains of the ordinary judiciary's former constitutional role
is the jurisdiction to hear cases brought for the protection of constitutional rights under the
new action of tutela, see id. art. 86, an action for the injunctive protection of an individual's
constitutional rights, similar to the amparo action existing in other Latin American legal
systems. However, even in that case, the decision of the ordinary courts to grant or refuse an
order for the protection of the applicant's rights will be subject to review by the Constitu-
tional Court, see id. art. 241(9). The Colombian Constitutional Court has not yet begun to
function and it is thus unclear what its eventual impact may be. There is, however, little
reason to believe that it will result in any kind of fundamental transformation of the Colom-
bian political system. The structure of its jurisdiction in no way challenges the tradition of
presidential dominance which is the fundamental defect in Latin American public law
systems.
77. On the desire for an independent Constitutional Court as one of the primary moti-
vations for the latest round of Colombian constitutional reform, see DIEGo URIBE VARGAS,
ESTRUCTURA CONSTITUCIONAL PARA EL CAMBIO 114-35 (1986).
78. Barker, supra note 59, at 891.
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the slightest hint of crisis is equally strong, as indicated by the
recent Brazilian experience with its Constitution of 1988 and the
initial popularity in Peru of President Fujimori's coup.79 The ten-
dency of Latin American legal systems to waver and move towards
incorporating elements of a rival paradigm can be understood in
this context as reflecting a double ambivalence: an ambivalence as
to the necessity of a strong executive authority, as well as to the
methods of controlling such an executive.
The U.S. constitutional paradigm represents, in theory at
least, one way of checking presidential power through the external
review of executive acts, judged on substantive, exterior criteria
contained (again, at least theoretically) within the constitutional
text, by an independent judiciary, itself forming a separate branch
of government.80 The French model of administrative law repre-
sents, in contrast, a means by which an organ internal to the exec-
utive determines whether executive decisions and pronouncements
are consonant with the rule of law.81
Thus, it would be false to suggest, as one may be all too easily
79. Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil's New Constitutionalism: An Exercise in Transient Con-
stitutionalism for a Transitional Society, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 773 (1990); James Brooke,
Peru's Chief: Every Bit the Emperor, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16, 1992, at A3; Nathaniel C. Nash,
Peru Chief Orders New Mass Arrests, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1992, at A12; Nathaniel C. Nash,
Peru's. Basic Problems Won't Be Ordered Away, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1992, at 4(2).
80. Of course, it would be idle to pretend that all the criteria for solving even the most
straight-forward constitutional issues are really contained in the Constitution and are actu-
ally external to the courts. Such a simple, positivist account is not really viable in any legal
domain. The court is and has always been a political organ, reacting to the social and eco-
nomic exigencies of the time and bringing to bear on its decisions its view of the politics of
the moment. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 49-73 (1986); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 121-32 (1961).
81. It is, of course, possible to question the extent to which the Conseil d'Etat, acting
in its adjudicative role, and its subordinate administrative tribunals, can really be seen as an
arm of the executive, as opposed to being considered merely a specialized set of courts.
Formal analysis leads to the first conclusion, while a functional one points towards the lat-
ter. Nevertheless, both disguise the essential reality of the Conseil d'Etat's internal organi-
zation and membership. It is crucial to remember that it is staffed not by successful private
lawyers and political appointees, but rather by civil servants who will generally have served
elsewhere in the executive arm of the administration before coming to sit in judgment on
the actions of their colleagues. This understanding of, and affinity with, the position of ac-
tive administrators is reinforced by the requirement of rotation among the Council's adjudi-
catory, and drafting and advisory sections, introduced by De Gaulle following the Canal
affair. See WALiNE, supra note 7, at 28-31; 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 477-87; BROWN &
GARNER, supra note 2, at 38-39. There is, therefore, a very strong basis for interpreting the
French paradigm as an independent arm of the executive sitting in judgment on the active
administration, whatever functional similarity the Council may bear to a specialized admin-
istrative court.
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tempted to do from a common law perspective, that the pull to-
wards the French model simply corresponds to an authoritarian
tendency to rely on the executive in times of crisis and to relieve it
from the external control of the ordinary courts. In reality, the
French paradigm, like the U.S. model, represents an attempt to
subordinate executive authority to the rule of law. Indeed, the ten-
dency in countries like Argentina to introduce the French model
may have as much to do with concern about the ordinary courts'
lack of effectiveness in checking executive excesses as a belief in
the need to relieve the executive from judicial interference. Thus,
the two rival models must be analogized not to tendencies to check
or expand executive power, but rather to the complexity of re-
sponses that the aspiration to subordinate the executive to the law
has engendered: each provides a theoretical framework for the re-
straint of unprincipled executive action. In this respect, the contin-
uing debate on the appropriate administrative law model for Latin
America is entirely analogous to the debate on whether a presiden-
tial or parliamentary system would better fit the needs of Latin
American political development."2
What becomes clear when the debate is placed in this context
is that there can be no easy answer to the question of which con-
ception of public law is most suitable for the Latin American legal
systems. The argument that Latin American nations should adopt
82. The question of whether parliamentarianism or presidentialism represents a better
form of government for nations attempting to transform themselves into industrialized and
developed democracies on the Western European and Northern American model is a hotly
debated issue in political science. In Latin America, the debate is complicated by the re-
gion's tradition of authoritarian government, so that the question joins the broader one of
whether reacting against the tradition of executive dominance or attempting to shape and
make use of that tradition represents a better path to genuine participatory democracy.
James L. Busey, Observations on Latin-American Constitutionalism, 24 THE AMERICAs 46
(1967); Carlos Santiago Nino, Transition to Democracy, Corporatism and Constitutional
Reform in Latin America, 44 U. MIAmn L. REv. 129 (1989). It may be that the best solution
would be to blend both approaches. Certainly, the French Constitution of 1958 with its
strong president and strong prime minister has ushered in an era of constitutional stability
previously unknown in modern French history. The most recent Brazilian Constitution took
some steps towards blending the two approaches, but the framers appear to have been too
hesitant to insure anything more than friction and mutual recrimination between the two
branches. Keith S. Rosenn, supra note 79, at 773-89. The challenge is not simply to split
power between the executive and the legislative or even between different elements of an
executive, such as the president and the government, but to split power in such a way so
that both branches must work together to exercise their own powers. In France during the
period of cohabitation in the mid-1980s, when for the first time one party dominated the
assembly and government while the other controlled the presidency, the system proved suc-
cessful in forcing the parties to work together to achieve their own political goals, thus
preventing paralysis and instability. GICQUEL, supra note 18, at 585-88.
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the U.S. paradigm of a constitutionally-based administrative law
because the U.S. conception of separation of powers is strongly em-
bedded in Latin American constitutions misses the point.83 Consti-
tutional and administrative law form a single, interlinking public
law domain. Simply to rely on the postulate of constitutional law
as the most fundamental law tells us nothing about what the con-
tent of that law should be. Thus, in trying to develop for Latin
America a system that will achieve the ideal of public law, that is
to say, a system in which the exercise of power is subordinated to
the principle of legality, it is vital to rethink not only the adminis-
trative order, but also and simultaneously the constitutional order.
Given the extent to which the U.S. paradigm of constitutional
law relies on the prestigious position that common law courts have
occupied for hundreds of years as interpreters and enforcers of
public law, it is hard to see how the adoption of this model could
be anything but problematic for nations whose positive law and
general legal conceptions remain firmly within the civil law tradi-
tion. In the nearly two centuries since the establishment of the
U.S. paradigm of public law as the dominant model for Latin
American constitutionalism, relatively little progress has been
made in checking, or even shaping, the reality of executive domi-
nance of government."
This is not a call for an abandonment of the U.S. conception
of public law by Latin American nations. Indeed, the U.S. notion
of separation of powers is as much a part of the Latin American
tradition of constitutional law as it is in the United States. This is
a call for experimentation. Given the lack of success in using judi-
cial control of administrative action, it is time to consider whether
the real focus of attention should instead be restructuring execu-
tive power.
D. The Functional Advantages of the French Model in the
Latin American Context
The most interesting possibilities for restructuring Latin
American public law systems reside in the internal division of ex-
ecutive power, the prototype of which is found in French adminis-
trative law and its development of the Conseil d'Etat into an inde-
83. For such an argument, see 1 MAIRAL, supra note 60, at vii-ix, 102-10.
84. Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and Its
Failure in Latin America, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 20 (1990).
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pendent, executive-branch organ, responsible for assuring the
legality of governmental action. This pattern of the internal divi-
sion of executive power lies at the heart of the current French con-
stitution, which provides for both a strong president and a strong
prime minister, and the division of executive power between the
two. 6 Not only has this structure produced a far higher degree of
constitutional stability in the last thirty years than at any other
moment in modern French history, but it has also permitted the
rapid development of a new and popularly legitimate organ of con-
stitutional review, as well as an innovative constitutional jurispru-
dence on fundamental rights. s8
The French constitutional system is no more than one model
among many, and contains a number of idiosyncrasies that would
be inappropriate in the Latin American context."7 But the internal
division of executive authority, upon which its administrative law
is based, may have much to offer Latin American nations. It is no
easier to provide a general theory to account for the success of
French administrative law in subordinating the exercise of execu-
tive authority to the principle of legality than it is to provide such
an explanation for the success of U.S. constitutional law in fulfil-
ling the same function. Thus, there is no a priori reason to assume
that either system represents a better model for the control of ex-
ecutive authority in the Latin American context. Yet, some of the
features that have been invoked to explain the success of the
French system find a strong echo in Latin American legal systems.
Probably the single most important reason for the success of
the Conseil d'Etat lies in its composition. Although the section du
contentieux functions as a court, it is made up of career civil ser-
vants, many of whom join the Council only after a long career in
other branches of the administration. 8 Furthermore, since the
1963 reforms, all members of the section du contentieux are peri-
odically assigned to the drafting and advisory sections of the Coun-
85. See AvRL, supra note 18, at 29-32; Comitb National, supra note 58, at 77-79, 149-
54.
86. GICQUEL, supra note 18, at 564-71, 578-88, 619-837.
87. Given Latin America's unfortunate experiences with state of siege provisions, it is
rather frightening to think what uses a Latin American president might make of the vague
and extensive emergency powers that Article 16 of the French Constitution of 1958 entrust
to the President. GICQutL, supra note 18, at 669-75.
88. The rest are recruited directly from among the top graduates of the National School
of Administration (E.N.A.), France's elite graduate school. BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2,
at 52-53; 1 CHAPus, supra note 12, at 300; WALzNE, supra note 7, at 148-49.
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cil, and members from those sections are similarly assigned to the
section du contentieux 9 It is also common for members of the
Council to be seconded to high positions elsewhere in the adminis-
tration during the course of their careers. The members of the sec-
tion du contentieux thus tend to have an intimate familiarity with
not only all aspects of administrative law, but also the political re-
alities of administration. When the actions of a French administra-
tor are reviewed by the Council, the administration thus has no
cause to feel that its authority is being challenged by a judge with
little understanding of the exigencies of the exercise of administra-
tive power. Rather the administrator is being judged both by an
equal, as the judge is a fellow administrator, and a superior, as the
Council is comprised of the cream of the civil service."
Another related factor in the success of the Council is its cor-
porate nature. Although members may leave for periods of time to
work elsewhere in the administration or to serve as politicians,
they generally remain members of the Council throughout their ca-
reer and are liable to be recalled to resume active service on the
Council."1 These two factors (the Council's respected position
within the administration and its own esprit de corps) have in-
sured not only the effectiveness of the Council's decisions, but have
also contributed to the simplicity and flexibility of the substantive
tests employed. The Council's intimate knowledge of administra-
tion and its confidence in its own ability to make judgments as to
what constitutes good government have enabled it to rest a policy
of tough, intrusive review on very general and abstract standards,
such as violation of the law and misuse of power.9
2
The standards of review that the Council has developed flow
from its special institutional position. The role of the Council as an
organ of review internal to the executive creates a subtle, but vi-
tally important difference in the French administrative law's con-
ception of discretion and the scope of review. Under the common
law model, the concept of discretion is the basis for the court's
right of review. The court interferes only when the administrator
89. See BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 38-39; 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 477-87;
WALINE, supra note 7, at 28-31.
90. BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 41-56; 1 CHAP S, supra note 12, at 300-01;
WALINE, supra note 7, at 148-152.
91. BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 54-56; 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 301; WALINE,
supra note 7, at 151-152.
92. BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 50-52, 108-14; 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 630-
76; WALINE, supra note 7, at 389-425.
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has gone beyond the bounds of discretion."3 Unless a grant of dis-
cretion is fettered by substantive criteria provided by the empow-
ering legislation, the only criteria that can logically be implied is
reasonableness. " Thus, the entire question for a common law ad-
ministrative judge generally comes down to a determination of the
reasonable boundaries of the relevant administrator's discretion.
9 5
Reasonableness forms the overarching standard of review, appear-
ing both in the construction of the discretion and as a substantive
criterion. 0
In the French conception of administrative law, by contrast,
discretion enters at a secondary level: as a limitation on the level of
review that a French administrative judge would ordinarily exer-
cise. This level of review requires the judge to decide what the
right administrative decision would have been in the relevant cir-
cumstances.97 This power of review is conceived of as inherent to
the executive, which has vested it in the Council and its
subordinate administrative tribunals, and can only be excluded by
specific legislative action. Such intrusive review is possible due to
its restricted scope. A French administrative judge reviews fully all
alleged errors of fact and jurisdiction, procedural improprieties,
and instances of bias or improper motivation, but only reviews an
administrator's legal characterization of the facts to the extent
that the law furnishes criteria by which to judge such characteriza-
tions.98 To the extent that no such criteria are provided, the ad-
ministrator has discretion to act, and any decision must be consid-
ered a right decision, provided the administrator acts in
accordance with the facts and the forms called for by the empow-
ering legislation and reaches a decision that is not manifestly
erroneous.
The important conceptual difference between taking reasona-
93. CRAIG, supra note 7, at 240-41, 279-80; KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 142-43, 151-55 (1980); BERNARD SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL
CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 209-16
(1972); WADE, supra note 7, at 23-26, 39-44.
94. In the U.S. administrative model, the criterion of reasonableness need not even gen-
erally be implied, since the argument can be framed as one of violation of a constitutional
right. The difference is purely formal, however, since constitutional limits relevant to ad-
ministrative action (e.g., due process) tend themselves to incorporate a reasonableness stan-
dard. SCHWARTZ & WADE, supra note 93, at 206-07, 239-51.
95. CRAIG, supra note 7, at 274-76, 289-305; WADE, supra note 7, at 36-38.
96. WADE, supra note 7, at 388-91, 395-410.
97. Bermann, supra note 2, at 206-14.
98. 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 660-69.
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bleness and taking rightness as the standard of review tends to be
disguised by the fact that under the French system, the fewer the
criteria provided by the empowering legislation, the greater the
discretion that must be imputed to the administrator and the more
likely it is that a reviewing judge will recognize the decision of the
administrator as a right decision. Of course, the administrator's de-
cisions are always subject to the minimum review for errors of fact
and jurisdiction, procedural improprieties, instances of bias or im-
proper motivation, and manifest legal error in the characterization
of the facts." Thus, in both systems, the greater the degree of dis-
cretion accorded, the more review tends towards a minimum rea-
sonableness standard. Nevertheless, this functional similarity must
not be allowed to disguise the essential difference in conceptions of
discretion because it has a significant impact on the procedure and
operation of each system's administrative tribunals.
Because the actions of French administrators are judged by a
standard of rightness rather than reasonableness, the administra-
tive tribunals tend to avoid adversarial proceedings, take a far
more active role in gathering evidence, and are, generally speaking,
less patient with vague justifications of the need for administrative
freedom and more ready to second guess their executive-branch
colleagues. In contrast to the substantial evidence rule that reigns
in one form or another throughout the common law world, and
which requires the private party to gather and present sufficient
evidence to make an arguable case that the administrator's conclu-
sions lack a reasonable factual basis, French administrative tribu-
nals take a far more active role in investigating the facts. 00
In the French administrative system, a suit filed by a private
plaintiff is assigned to a sub-section whose president will in turn
assign it to a member of the sub-section (the reporter) for instruc-
tion-the formal process by which the tribunal itself investigates
the underlying facts of the case. The reporter will apprise the rele-
vant governmental department of the complaint and invite its re-
sponse within a fairly brief period of time. This response will then
be made available to the plaintiff who has a similarly brief period
in which to make a written response. If these written statements
fail to resolve all the issues of fact initially raised, the reporter has
full power to order depositions or an expert inquiry into technical
99. 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 634-59; Bermann, supra note 2, at 228-44.
100. CRAIG, supra note 7, at 341-43; WADE, supra note 7, at 341-44; Bermann, supra
note 2, at 199-201.
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aspects of the case. The reporter will then begin to draft his report
which will be considered by the full sub-section, which either
adopts it or requests the reporter to redraft it.101
Following adoption, the report is passed on to the member of
the sub-section who is acting as the commissaire du gouvernement
in the case. The commissaire is responsible for representing the
government's interest in the harmonious development of the law.
The commissaire will consider whether the case raises any difficult
or novel points of law in deciding to present a brief and oral argu-
ment.102 Once the commissaire has either prepared the brief or de-
cided to make no submission, the same sub-section, generally sit-
ting together with one or more sub-sections, depending on the
complexity and importance of the case, will reach a judgment on
the basis of the report and the commissaire's conclusions. 08
The proceedings thus remain essentially inquisitorial through-
out the hearing of the case. This remains true, even when, as is
generally the case, the Council is hearing the suit as an appeal
from a decision of an appellate administrative court which itself
hears appeals from first-instance administrative tribunals. When
sitting as an administrative tribunal of last resort, the Council con-
tinues to follow the same basic procedure, even though the lower
administrative tribunals follow substantially similar procedures
and a report on the underlying facts is already available. The
Council is not precluded from re-examining the facts of the case
and revising the lower court's findings.'01 This feature of the
French system enshrines as a matter of procedure the critical atti-
tude towards executive action that has been decisive in the success
of the French model of administrative law. Commentators are
unanimous in maintaining that French administrative judges hold
their executive-branch colleagues to a significantly higher standard
of principled decision-making.105
101. RENA CHAPUS, DROIT DU CoNTENTIEux ADMINISTRATIF 335-70 (1982).
102. BROWN & GARNER, supra note 2, at 64.
103. CHAPUS, supra note 101, at 409-26.
104. 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 496.
105. Bermann, supra note 2, at 206; Edwin W. Borchard, French Administrative Law,
18 IOWA L. REV. 133, 135 (1932); LUon Duguit, The French Administrative Courts, 29 POL.
Sci. Q. 385, 392-93 (1914); M. Letourneur, Le contrble de V'administration par le juge ad-
ministratif, 1964 PuB. L. 9; Prosper Weil, The Strengths and Weaknesses of French Admin-




The functional theory of comparative public law that this pa-
per has developed comes down to the proposition that a system of
public law is only as effective as the institutional bodies that take
ultimate responsibility for it. The success of the Anglo-American
model of public law depends on the special historical position of
the judiciary, a status that the ordinary judiciary of civil law coun-
tries have never achieved. Thus, the attempt to incorporate the
U.S model of judicial review as a means of controlling the execu-
tive has proven largely unsuccessful. The French model of internal
review by a separate arm of the executive branch is more compati-
ble with the civil law traditions of Latin American countries and
therefore, may be a more effective means of restraining unprinci-
pled executive action.
In Latin American legal systems, the civil service, particularly
its upper echelons, generally enjoys a prestige as high as that of its
French counterpart. Furthermore, corporate bodies and corporat-
ism have long flourished as a mode of governance in Latin
America. 106 Even where the judiciary has at times been able to
achieve sufficient independence to exercise its constitutional juris-
diction, Latin American countries have tended to use the Anglo-
American concept of reasonableness to fashion weak, unintrusive
standards of review that simply do not represent an adequate
check on executive authority.
107
106. Nino, supra note 82, at 141-46.
107. The standards of review adopted by the Argentine courts in the field of petitions
for habeas corpus and amparo provide an excellent illustration of this tendency. Although
the Supreme Court has asserted its jurisdiction to review the reasonableness of both execu-
tive suspension of constitutional rights during a state of siege, see Judgment of May 22,
1959 (Antonio Sofia), CSJN, 243 Fallos 504, 513 (1959) (Arg.), and, after some hesitation, of
detention under the President's Article 23 emergency powers, see Judgment of Aug. 9, 1977
(Carlos Mariano Zamorano), CSJN, 298 Fallos 441, 443 (1977) (Arg.), it has failed, to date,
to adopt a standard of reasonableness that represents a real check on the unfettered discre-
tion of the executive to order a detention. In Zamorano, the court accepted as unreviewable
any colorable assertion by the executive that the person being held was a threat to national
security. In the recent case of Granada, Judgment of Dec. 3, 1985 (Jorge Horacio Granada),
CSJN, 307 Fallos 2304 (1985) (Arg.), the majority hewed narrowly to the same line, ignoring
provisions in the Habeas Corpus Law of 1984 (passed after the fall of the military govern-
ment) that pointed towards a far broader and more intrusive standard of review (particu-
larly Article 4(1) and (2)). Cynthia A. Lynch, Constitutional Ambiguity and Abuse in Ar-
gentina-The Military Reign 1976-1983, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 353 (1989); John P.
Mandler, Habeas Corpus and the Protection of Human Rights in Argentina, 16 YALE J.
INT'L. L. 3 (1991).
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Moving away from a conception of public law litigation as an
adversarial proceeding designed to establish the reasonableness of
administrative action, and towards one that places on the tribunal
the responsibility for investigating the correctness of the executive
action, could lead to far more intrusive standards, and even more
crucially to a critical culture of review among those charged with
maintaining an effective public law system. Finally, it is important
to note that, unlike the U.S. paradigm of public law, the success of
the French model of the internal division of executive power and
self-review does not depend on constitutional stability. Indeed, the
Conseil d'ttat has flourished in its absence.010
The French paradigm of public law can no more be written off
in the Latin American context than can that of the United States.
The challenge is to look to the goal behind the U.S. conception of
separation of powers and not to get bogged down in the means
adopted by the U.S. Constitution. Perhaps no one more eloquently
captured this lesson, or would today be more ready to recognize
the possibilities implicit in dividing executive power from within
along the lines of the French model of public law, than the author
of The Federalist No. 51:
To what expedient then shall we finally resort, for maintaining
in practice the necessary partition of power among the several
departments, as laid down in the constitution? The only answer
that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are
found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so con-
triving the interior structure of the government, as that its sev-
eral constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
means of keeping each other in their proper places. 109
108. Just because it is clear that constitutional instability failed to hinder the develop-
ment of either the Conseil d',tat or of French administrative law in general does not mean
that it would be correct to assume that such instability actually fostered their growth. Al-
though the absence of a developed constitutional domain insured that the domain of admin-
istrative law would be a broad one, the French Constitution of 1958 achieved continued
constitutional stability and continued prosperity for the Conseil d'Etat by carrying forward
this pattern of dividing the executive powers between a strong president and a strong prime
minister. 1 CHAPUS, supra note 12, at 298-305.
109. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 264 (James Madison or Alexander Hamilton) (Max
Beloff ed., 1987).
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